NEW YORK - TelAve -- April & July 2002: Boeing's Early Certification Manipulation

After 9/11, Boeing faced the possibility of losing 20,000 to 30,000 employees. In April 2002, Boeing implemented a special process certification issued by the Performance Review Institute (PRI) for heat treatment, welding, and non-destructive testing. By July 2002, Boeing released a supplier bulletin for AS 9100, explicitly calling out ANSI–ANAB on their supplier portal. Suppliers were instructed to submit certifications and parts "if need be, or need arises," effectively eliminating redundant inspections and allowing Boeing to rely entirely on supplier-provided certifications.

At the same time, Boeing sat on ANSI–ANAB's webpage management system accreditation committee, the body responsible for granting, suspending, and withdrawing certifications. How could Boeing sit on the management committee council that grants, suspends, and withdraws certification when they were not AS 9100 certified for over 22 years? This is "FRAUD" said Daryl Guberman.  .

By October 2003, Boeing had integrated ANSI–ANAB's OASIS database, an online aerospace system controlled by the International Aerospace Quality Group (IAQG), which Boeing effectively dominated, further consolidating its control over supplier oversight.

2015–2021: Xiao Jianhua, Wuhan, and Systemic Oversight Failures

Between 2015 and 2021, Xiao Jianhua, a Chinese national with ties to communist China and was involved with U.S. and global quality since 1994, served as chairman of the International Accreditation Forum (IAF). During his tenure, accreditation oversight failed, and certificates were issued to facilities that were not properly prepared, both domestically and abroad. Xiao Jianhua was mandated by communist China under Article 7 of the China National Intelligence Law to collect data and send it back to Beijing, and his role as chairman of the IAF positioned him perfectly to do so (CYBERSECURITY).

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On January 12, 2017, Xiao Jianhua who was also chief executive of the China National Accreditation Services-CNAS, in Beijing  personally handed over a laboratory accreditation to the Wuhan BSL-4 lab but six months prior (approximately August 2016) scientists in the laboratory were complaining about not having enough highly trained technicians. They are critical to first line containment for the world's most dangerous pathogens. Six months later after issuing the laboratory certification, those concerns remained unaddressed. Similar lapses occurred in laboratories in the U.S., including Texas, where certifications were issued despite glaring readiness gaps.

Pamela Sale's Damning Admission

In a 2017 sworn deposition, Pamela Sale, Vice President of Laboratory Accreditation for ANSI–ANAB, confirmed that the lab certification system was fundamentally broken. Her words:

"One of the issues is that there is no commonly agreed-upon set of standards that forensics labs around the country have to follow. Instead, there are informal guidelines that labs can choose to follow or not."

If there were no enforced standards in U.S. labs, why would we expect rigorous oversight at foreign labs like Wuhan?

Conflict of Interest: Corporations and Federal Agencies on the Same Board

ANSI-ANAB claim to be neutral and independent — but their own governance proves otherwise. Their boards of directors include executives from Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin — major corporations that benefited from both vaccine development and aerospace contracts.

Even more disturbing, ANSI-ANAB also host and serve major U.S. federal agencies as both board members and paying customers, including:

• Department of Justice (DOJ)
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
• U.S. Department of Commerce
• Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

ANSI–ANAB: Founders and Legal Underwriters

ANSI–ANAB are founders of the International Accreditation Forum, Inc. (IAF) in Delaware, which has a sister organization, the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC) in Australia. Both are associations of accreditation bodies, national and international, equivalent in role to ANSI–ANAB. ANSI–ANAB are also underwriters for IAF and ILAC, meaning they assume all legal responsibility for systematic and product failures. Despite this legal and operational responsibility, oversight failures persisted under Xiao Jianhua's leadership, both in the U.S. and abroad.

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Invalid Certifications and Systemic Failure

The certificates issued under this system—whether aerospace, medical, or other industries by ANSI–ANAB or their internationally equivalent bodies—are truly not official. This problem began when Boeing did not pursue AS 9100 certification JULY 2002, and ANSI–ANAB, in concert with Boeing, fraudulently placed Boeing on their webpage management system accreditation committee, which has authority to grant, suspend, and withdraw certifications.

This alone does not give credibility to any certification, whether it is AS 9100, ISO 9001, or any other ISO-derived certification. The lack of proper oversight at Boeing set the precedent for the broader failures seen in domestic and international lab accreditation. Aerospace, automotive and other industries

Boeing and ANSI–ANAB: Parallel Failures Across Sectors

The failures in Boeing's certification system mirror the problems in laboratory accreditation. Certificates may appear valid on paper but are functionally useless without independent oversight. Between 2002 and 2021, ANSI–ANAB-accredited businesses and laboratories were effectively under foreign influence while being assured of "official" certification.

Boeing's early reliance on supplier certifications, combined with oversight failures by ANSI–ANAB, created a blueprint for unchecked, high-risk practices—a pattern repeated across aerospace and medical sectors and other industries.

DARYL GUBERMAN: Exposing the Corruption

Recognized quality expert DARYL GUBERMAN has spent decades uncovering these systemic failures. From Boeing's early certification shortcuts to Wuhan's ill-prepared BSL-4 laboratory, the same patterns emerge: governance influenced by conflict of interest, regulatory capture, and corporate self-interest.

The certificates issued under this system—whether aerospace or medical or other industries—are not truly official. They may appear accredited, but without independent oversight, they are effectively meaningless, posing significant risks to businesses who maintain ANSI-ANAB accreditation and public safety worldwide.

Daryl Guberman is a 40 year, recognized quality assurance expert & Boeing shareholder stood before the DHS Subcommittee on April 17, 2024, advocating for transparency and aviation safety on behalf of 4.7 billion passengers worldwide.          https://www.newstribune.com/photos/2024/apr/18/3749044/