WASHINGTON - TelAve -- Although many are praising the security at the correspondents' dinner because it did prevent the gunman from entering the ballroom, there was at least one deadly but easily corrected security flaw which should have been obvious to anyone who saw the madman sprint through the first line of defense, says professor John Banzhaf, a former security officer and security consultant.

What was supposed to be the first line (outer perimeter) of protection provided no more protection than if it hadn't existed.

Banzhaf notes that had the intruder been wearing body armor, and carried a machine gun, he might well have been able to mow down the officers at the ballroom door and gained entrance.

If he had a powerful bomb strapped to his body, he - like many other fanatics - could have set it off the instant he ran through the doors to the ballroom; killing and injuring many people even if he himself was neutralized the moment he made it inside.

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Even worse, had there been 2 or 3 sprinters wearing body armor and carrying machine guns, they almost certainly could have overwhelmed the next line of protection at the ballroom door since the first line of protection would offer no resistance to anyone running, he says.

The simple technique for preventing the enemy from simply charging through the checkpoint is one which was frequently utilized since the Middle Ages - deny them a clear straight path by forcing them to zig and zag around several obstacles (physical barriers) which block all of the hallway except for a narrow passage; 1 opening on the left, followed by 1 on the right, and then a 3rd on the left.

Ideally the 3 (or more) barriers should be solid pieces of furniture tall enough that they cannot be jumped over, and heavy enough that they cannot easily be pushed aside.  If such objects aren't among the many pieces likely to be found at the hotel, they could easily be brought in from other locations.

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Even long serving tables would be better than nothing.  Forcing an intruder to either try jumping over them or pushing the tables aside would slow him down so that he couldn't just sprint past the surprised officers, says Banzhaf.

A checkpoint which assumes that anyone approaching would walk up to it and politely present themselves for inspection offers no real protection.

Yes, protection should be multi-layered, but each layer must offer significant protection; especially when the president, vice president, and most of the people in the line of succession are present and vulnerable, argues Banzhaf.

Let's hope that everyone involved learned an important life-and-death lesson, he suggests..

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